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discussed above. Although the goal of such legislation is admirable,
the path has not been entirely free from obstacles. Nevertheless,
until such time as an international cooperative effort is undertaken
to relieve the current situation, there would appear to be no other
course. The injustice produced in certain instances could largely be
remedied by means of a more uniform judicial application. A single,
reasonable standard for determining whether or not actions falling
within the statute were voluntarily performed, and a common sense
adaptation of the election provisions to meet the circumstances of the
particular case,61 would together constitute a safeguard for the incalculable privilege of American citizenship while in no way impairing the effectiveness of the Act. The right of expatriation should
remain just that and should not, even for the most praiseworthy end,
be transformed into a penalty.

THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE STEIN CASE

"American criminal procedure has its defects, though
its essentials have behind them the vindication of long history. But all systems of law, however wise, are administered
through men and therefore may occasionally disclose the
frailties of men. Perfection may not be demanded of law,
but the capacity to counteract inevitable, though rare,
frailties is the mark of a civilized legal mechanism."
Mr. justice Frankfurter
in Rosenberg v. United States,
73 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1171 (1953).
On June 15, 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down its opinion in the case of Stein v. New York,'
popularly known as the "Reader's Digest Murder Case." Often the
opinions of a court are noteworthy for their dicta rather than the
61
For example, in Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760 (N. D. Cal.
1952), petitioner, a dual national, living in Italy, was inducted and served in
the Italian army. He was captured by the Germans and released in ill health
after which he remained in Italy until long past his majority. The court,
nonetheless, held that since his residence since that time was in part involuntary,
due to sickness, he had a reasonable time within which to exercise his right
of election rather than the strict statutory period. He first attempted to
return here 31 months after his release by the Germans and was held not to
have lost his American citizenship.
173 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953).
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point of law actually decided therein. The opinion in the Stein case
falls into this category. Because of the peculiar facts of the case, the
Court's holding is limited in scope. However, the opinion of the
Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Jackson, gives rise to several interesting and important collateral issues which seem to require a revaluation of, and investigation into, the principles and laws governing our administration of criminal law, with special emphasis upon
the persisting confession dilemma. The Stein case is chosen as the
medium through which to view the problem because it depicts, with
dramatic poignancy, the ever-present abuses of false arrest, unreasonable delay in arraignment and coerced confessions, and represents, in
the writer's opinion, retrogression rather than progress in the search
for justice.
The Facts
The facts of the Stein case, as presented to the Supreme Court,
were as follows: The three appellants were convicted of felony
murder in Westchester County, New York.2 At the trial the district attorney offered as evidence two confessions allegedly made by
Harry Stein and Calman Cooper while in the custody of the State
Police. The defendants objected to the introduction of the confessions on the grounds that they were obtained by coercive methods
and were wholly involuntary. The trial judge, after a preliminary
hearing in the presence of the jury on the issue of coercion, left the
decision of the issue to the jury under instructions to consider the
confessions only if it found them to have been voluntary.3 The jury,
after hearing all the other evidence at the trial, returned a general
verdict of guilty. Six members of the Supreme Court held that the
conviction should stand. Recognizing that it was impossible to separate the jury's decision on the voluntary nature of the confessions
from the general verdict of guilty, the Court went on to decide that
on the evidence presented the jury would have been justified in finding the confessions to be voluntary and thus the conviction should
not be disturbed. 4 This was the true holding of the Stein case and
up to this point the decision is firmly supported by prior law on the
subject. The Court, however, apparently unwilling to let the alternative of the question pass without comment posed this hypothetical: "
2 The defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree for the
slaying of one Andrew Petrini, during the robbery of a delivery truck belonging to the Reader's Digest Publishing Company. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044(2).
3 It is interesting to note that the trial judge outlined his charge to the
jury from the case of Malinski v. New York, which is the case the Supreme
Court now tells us is not controlling. Transcript of Record, p. 1280, People
v. Cooper, 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
4 See Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1089, 1092 (1953).
5 Actually the hypothetical was originally proposed by the attorneys for the
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Would it be the duty of this Court to reverse the conviction if the jury
had found the confession to be involuntary but had nonetheless convicted on the basis of the other strong evidence of guilt? A majority
of the Court answered this inquiry in the negative claiming that "due
process" required them to reverse a conviction based on a coerced
confession only if the other evidence of guilt would have been insufficient without the confession. 6 The Court dismissed as mere dicta
the language of Malinski v. New York 7 wherein it was claimed that
".. . if it [the coerced confession] is introduced at the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the evidence apart
from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict." 8 Thus the majority of the Court is of the opinion that a
jury can effectively disregard a confession of guilt, found to be involuntary, and render an unbiased decision upon the basis of the other
evidence introduced, without that process endangering the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial.
The Confessions
The majority of the Court has assumed that the confessions made
by Stein and Cooper were voluntary, that is, not made under threats
or torture or promises of immunity. In his opinion Mr. Justice
Jackson points to certain circumstances surrounding the confessions
which, to the minds of the majority at least, substantiate the alleged
voluntary nature of the confessions. 9 Choosing Calman Cooper as an
example, let us review the circumstances surrounding his confession
and then revaluate the merits of the claim that it satisfied the requirements of voluntariness prescribed by the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure.10 Most prosecutions start with an arrest and Calman
Cooper's was no exception. He and his father were arrested around
9:00 A.M. on June 5. Neither was informed of the charge against
him and indeed there appears to have been no valid reason for the
arrest of Cooper's father.11 Both men were taken to a police station
defense, but since the Court has adopted it this article shall refer to it as
"the Court's hypothetical."
6 See Stein v. New York, supra note 4 at 1094-1095.
7 324 U. S. 401 (1945).
8

Id. at 404.

See Stein v. New York, supra note 4 at 1091-1094.
"A confession of a defendant, whether
in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in
evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by
threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he shall
not be prosecuted therefor; but is not sufficient to warrant his conviction,
without additional proof that the crime has been committed."
1 It is interesting to note that the arrests of Cooper and his father seem
to have been technically unlawful. The district attorney claimed that he had
a parole warrant for Cooper's arrest but did not produce the warrant because
he believed it to be inadmissible since it would indicate to the jury that Cooper
0

10 N. Y. CODE CRim. PRoC. § 395.
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in New York City and held, until around 1:00 P.M. of the same
day, without being booked.' 2 They were then taken to the State
Police Barracks at Hawthorne, New York. It is not clear from the
testimony whether any record was kept of their presence at the barracks but it is clear that no such record, if made, was available to any
one but the police.'3 Upon arrival at the barracks father and son
were separated. Calman Cooper was taken to one room in which he
remained, constantly, for at least thirty hours. 14 During this time
he was questioned for long periods by various officers. 15 His father
was taken to another part of the building and, from all appearances,
was forgotten until some sixty hours later when he was unhandcuffed
and released because his son had finally confessed. 16 During this
period Calman's brother, Morris, had been arrested in New York
City and was being held on a parole violation charge.17 Calman
Cooper confessed at approximately 2:00 A.M. on June 7, some forty
had a prior criminal record. However, the arrest of Cooper's father is inexcusable. Sgt. Sayers, the arresting officer, testified first that he had no
charge against Cooper's father but admits that the latter was handcuffed for
at least sixty hours. Transcript of Record, pp. 1310, 1365, 1371, People v.
Cooper, 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952). He later testified that he
was holding Cooper's father as a material witness. Record, p. 1367. This
claim would seem to have no reasonable foundation since not only did Sayers
fail to commit the father pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, but it does not appear that he or anyone else questioned Cooper's
father during the sixty hours of his detention to determine whether or not he
knew anything about the crime. This practice of holding a person as a
"material witness" has been condemned as a method of circumventing the
prompt arraignment requirements of Section 165 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure. See People v. Perez, 300 N. Y. 208, 221, 90 N. E. 2d
40, 47 (1949) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 952 (1950).
12 There is no explanation given for this procedure, but it is clear that the
man could have been arraigned at that time.
13 Failure to maintain accurate records of persons detained by the police is
a dangerous practice since under such circumstances, a person may be held
indefinitely without any opportunity to exercise his rights. In the Stein case
records were made of the defendants' fingerprints but the record on appeal
clearly indicates that no other record of their detention was available to the
defense attorneys.
.4 The approximate length of time during which Cooper was detained in the
one room can be inferred from the testimony of Corporal McLaughlin.
Transcript of Record, p. 1208, People v. Cooper, supra note 11. This same
state trooper testified that he was not familiar with Section 1844 of the New
York Penal Law, which makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to delay the
arraignment of a prisoner. Record, p. 1222.
15 The questioning of Cooper continued over a twelve-hour period and was
accomplished by police interrogators using a relay technique. Stein v. New
York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1093 (1953).
16 Cooper's father was fingerprinted, handcuffed and left in a room at the
police barracks apparently forgotten. He was unceremoniously released some
sixty hours later when it no longer seemed expedient to hold him. See testimony of Sgt. Sayers, Transcript of Record, pp. 1365-1375, People v. Cooper,
supra note 11.
17 See Stein v. New York, sapra note 15 at 1084.
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hours after his arrest, but not before he had secured promises for
his father's release and assurance that his brother would be unmolested.' 8 All three defendants were finally arraigned on the evening of June 8.?9 The prison doctor who examined him testified that
Cooper had bruises on the chest, stomach, right arm, and both
buttocks. 20
The trial judge charged as a matter of law that the delay in arraignment was unreasonable so there is no controversy on that score. 21
One of the most startling aspects of this case is that the police officers
to them that the
who testified all blandly stated that it never occurred
22
prisoners should be taken before a magistrate.
Mr. Justice Jackson tells us that Cooper's bargaining for the
release of his father and brother "... reduces to absurdity his present
claim, that he was coerced into confession." 23 There are a variety
of methods by which a man's will may be broken. A strong man who
can sustain personal physical torture beyond belief may well cringe in
terror at the thought of such torture being inflicted upon the person
of his father or brother. Furthermore, a confession obtained by bargaining, as a general rule of evidence, is considered highly untrustworthy. 24 In this respect it should be noted that the New York
statute governing "promises of immunity" is entirely too limited in
scope to be effective. 25
1s The promise to Cooper that his brother would not be prosecuted was
made by Parole Commissioner Donovan after Cooper had refused to accept
the promise of one Reardon, an employe of the parole board. Ibid.
19 The record on appeal discloses that while the defendants were being
arraigned, there were large groups of state troopers surrounding them, many
of whom were the former interrogators. Transcript of Record, p. 1329, People
v. Cooper 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
2073 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1085 (1953). Wissner, one of the defendants, had a
broken rib, various bruises and abrasions on the side, legs, stomach and buttocks.
Ibid.
21 Transcript of Record, p. 2777, People v. Cooper, supra note 19.
22 See testimony of Corporal McLaughlin, Transcript of Record, p. 1210,
and Sgt. Sayers, Transcript of Record, pp. 1360, 1367, People v. Cooper,
supra note 19.
23 Stein v. New York, supra note 20.
24 See 3 WIGIWOa., EvmFnrcn § 834 (3d ed. 1940).
25 Section 395 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
promise of immunity must be made by the district attorney or someone authorized by him, in order that the confession made in reliance on such promises
be rendered inadmissible. It would seem that this is true because the district
attorney is the only one in the position to carry out such promises, and thus the
prisoner cannot reasonably rely on the promise of a lesser person. See People
v. Stielow, 161 N. Y. Supp. 599, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd mem., 217 N. Y.
641, 112 N. E. 1069 (1916). Furthermore it would seem, from a reading of
the New York statute, that the promise must be for the defendant's personal
immunity and thus would not cover a situation like that of the Stein case,
where the promises inured to the benefit of the defendant's family. It is
difficult to imagine why such a distinction should be made if basic unreliability
ir the objection to confessions obtained in this manner. For the view of the
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The majority, in an effort to offset the apparent unreliability of
such a confession, points to the almost perfect "dove-tailing" of the
confessions with the extrinsic facts which it says ".

.

. could have

been fabricated only by a person gifted with extraordinarily creative
imagination." 26 It is submitted that the absence of contradiction in
the confessory statement of a man accused of a crime is as indicative
of a single
controlling hand, i.e., the police interrogator's, as it is of
27
veracity.
The prosecution's entire case of rebuttal to the coercion charges
consists of denials by police officers, admittedly guilty of violating
the New York Code of Criminal Procedure 28 and apparently of unlawful arrest. 29 Furthermore, the only explanation the police can
offer for the multiple fractures and bruises suffered by all three defendants is that they might have occurred before arrest. 30 It should
here be noted that in the State of New York the burden of explaining
such injuries to a prisoner is upon the prosecution. 31
The majority of the Court tells us that the weakness of the defendants' claim is demonstrated by their failure to testify on their
own behalf.32 A glance at the prior criminal records of these men
will serve to explain their reluctance to subject themselves to impeachment. 33 Mr. Justice Jackson frequently refers to these criminal
records as evidencing the defendants' guilt. The writer cannot help
but agree with the majority that in all probability these men were
guilty of the crime charged. This conclusion, however, is not determinative of the coercion question nor does a defendant's guilt render
inconsequential a denial of "due process."
A close reading of the majority opinion in the Stein case, especially in view of the Court's answer to the hypothetical question, gives
the reader cause to wonder whether the Court actually believed the
confessions to have been voluntary. The question posed by the Court,
as to the effect of a coerced confession where the other evidence is
ample to sustain conviction, has never, in the opinion of Justice Jackcourts of California on this subject, see People v. Orloff, 64 Cal. App. 2d
614, 151 P. 2d 288, 291 (1944). The Stein case points up the danger of restricting the rule to promises made by the district attorney since in that case
the only logical person to promise immunity for Cooper's brother was Parole
Commissioner Donovan. See note 18 supra. A broader, more comprehensive
rule is set forth in the Model Code of Evidence, Rule 505. See note 65 infra.
26 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1084 (1953).
27For another example of a too perfect confession, see People v.
Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 404, 180 N. E. 94, 98 (1932).
28 N. Y. CODE CRIer. PRoc. § 165. The defendant must in all cases be taken
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
29
30
31

See note 11 supra.

33

Ibid.

See Stein v. New York, supra note 26 at 1085.
See People v. Valletutti, 297 N. Y. 226, 230, 78 N. E. 2d 485, 486 (1948):
People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170, 176, 172 N. E. 458, 460 (1930).
32 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1088, 1092 (1953).
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son, been directly before the Court, 34 so that the Stein case may have
presented an irresistible temptation to the Court to express its opinion on the matter. Another related question which springs into mind
is: Why did the Court of Appeals affirm the conviction without
rendering an opinion? 35 Surely the opportunity for adopting or rejecting the language of the Malinski case was as apparent to that
Court as it was to the United States Supreme Court. In the writer's
opinion the Court of Appeals, recognizing that any answer it could
make to the question would seriously affect the New York practice
of allowing juries to settle the coercion questions, considered it better
policy to affirm on the narrow facts of this case and wait for the
Supreme Court to make the first move.
A better understanding of the problems arising from the Stein
case can be gained by a brief reference to the New York courts' procedure in cases of this type since it is this procedure which lies at
the root of the controversy. Pursuant to statute in New York, confessions obtained by duress or made in response to promises of immunity by the district attorney are inadmissible as evidence.3 6 It is
also clear that in New York, as well as the other forty-seven states,
the admission of a coerced confession into evidence is violative of
"due process" if that confession is a contributing factor toward the
conviction.3 7 If otherwise admissible, it is no objection to a confession that it was obtained during an unreasonable delay in arraignment.38 However, such delay is a factor to be considered in determining the ultimate question of voluntariness. 39 The question as to
whether the confession is voluntary or involuntary is, in the first instance, for the judge to decide. 40 If the evidence pertaining to coercion gives rise to a substantial question of fact the judge may submit
the question to the jury with instructions to disregard it if they find
it to have been involuntary. 41 The burden of proving
the confession
42
to be voluntary in nature is upon the prosecution.
34 Id. at 1095. Mr. Justice Jackson had hinted at his belief that the hypothetical question was a novel one to the Supreme Court in his concurring opin-

ion in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55, 70 (1951).

The majority opinion
in that case, however, reiterated the rule of Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.
401 (1945). Id. at 63.
35 People v. Cooper, 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
36 N. Y. CODE CIuM. PROC. § 395.

37 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309

U. S. 227 (1940); Malinski v. New York, supra note 34; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; People v. Leyra, 302
N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553 (1951), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 918 (1953).
38 See People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N. E. 289 (1934); People v.
Cohen, 243 App. Div. 245, 276 N. Y. Supp. 851 (2d Dep't 1935).
39 See People v. Malinski, 292 N. Y. 360, 55 N. E. 2d 353 (1944) ; People
v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 180 N. E. 94 (1932).
40 See People v. Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118, 122, 161 N. E. 441, 443 (1928).
41 See People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 416, 159 N. E. 379, 381 (1927);
People v. White, 176 N. Y. 331, 350, 68 N. E. 630, 636 (1903).
42 See People v. Doran, supL, note 41 at 416, 159 N. E. at 381.
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Where the judge, after a preliminary hearing on the coercion
issue, declares the confession to be involuntary and excludes it, there
is no problem. Similarly, if the confession is clearly the product of
a free will, its admission into evidence violates no right of the defendant. 43 On the other hand, it is well settled that a conviction based
largely on a coerced confession which has been admitted into evidence
cannot be permitted to stand since not only does it contravene Section
395 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, but its admission
is also violative of "due process." 44 The problematical questions
which arise in connection with coerced confessions are twofold.
1. If a confession, clearly the product of coercion, was declared to be voluntary by the judge and admitted into evidence,
should the conviction be permitted to stand if it appeared that the
other admissible evidence was sufficiently indicative of guilt?
2. If the question of coercion is submitted to the jury because
a substantial question of fact has arisen, and that body finds the confession to have been coerced but nevertheless convicts on the basis
of other evidence, will that conviction be permitted to stand?
Mr. Justice Jackson agrees that the first question should be answered in the negative for he tells us, "Of course, where the judge
makes a final determination that a confession is admissible and sends
it to the jury as a part of the evidence to be considered on the issue
of guilt and the ruling admitting the confession is found on review
to be erroneous, the conviction, at least normally, should fall with the
confession." 45

The majority balks, however, at rendering a nega-

tive answer to the second question, suggesting that such an answer
would be an unwarranted encroachment upon the province of the
jury. The confusion of the majority seems to be due to a failure
to recognize the fact that since we have as yet developed no procedure
by which the jury, in a case of this type, may render a special verdict,
an appellate court will never be called upon to consider the second
question in its exact form. At the appellate level, question two will
appear in the following form: If the question of coercion is submitted to the jury, even though it was clearly coerced, and the jury
returns a general verdict of guilty, must the conviction be reversed
43 See People v. Burke, 72 Misc. 336, 338, 131 N. Y. Supp. 122, 124 (Sup.
Ct. 1911) ; see N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 395.
4 See note 37 supra. It is interesting to note that the New York Court
of Appeals considered itself bound by the Malinski case and its reasoning.
since in People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 364, 98 N. E. 2d 553, 559 (1951), they
reiterated the principle of the Malinski case and reversed the conviction.
Finally, on a second appeal, after the involuntary confession had been excluded
from evidence and a new jury had convicted Leyra, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. People v. Leyra, 304 N. Y. 468, 108 N. E. 2d 673
(1952), cert. denied, 345 U. S.918 (1953).
4 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1096 (1953).
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if the other evidence of guilt, exclusive of the confession supplies a
sufficient basis for the conviction?
It is submitted that there is, in essence, no distinction between
the first question and the second, as it will appear to an appellate
court, and the answer to one must be controlling of the other. In both
cases the jury has heard a confession which should never have reached
their ears and the defendant is no less prejudiced by one procedure
than the other. The clear holding of Malinski v. New York 46 requires a reversal where such procedure has been followed, regardless
of the sufficiency of the other evidence. The attempt by the majority of the Court in the Stein case to classify the statements of the
Malinski case as dicta and their general approach to the reasons for
holding coerced confessions to be violative of "due process," clearly
indicates the Court's desire to halt a trend toward giving the "due
process" clause
a new, broader meaning, which has become apparent
47
as of late.
Before embarking on a discussion of the "new trend," let us
briefly examine the controversial case of Malinski v. New York. In
the Malinski case it appeared that the defendant had made four confessions to different people at various times. Of these four confessions, only the one made to the police was found by the Supreme
Court to be involuntary. The other three confessions, if believed by
48
the jury, would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Nevertheless, the Court reversed the conviction stating that "due
process" required a reversal where a coerced confession appeared in
evidence even though the other admissible evidence might be sufficient
proof of guilt. 49 That the Supreme Court considered this rule
0
binding upon them is uniquely demonstrated in Stroble v. California."
There the Supreme Court of California found one of seven confessions to be involuntary as a matter of law, yet allowed the conviction
to stand since it felt that five other confessions sufficiently justified
a verdict of guilty. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States, recognizing that if the California court's determination of the involuntary nature of the confession was correct, the rule of the Malinski
case would require reversal of the conviction,52 re-examined the cir46324 U. S. 401 (1945).
47 See Matherne, Pretrial Confessions-A New Rde, 22 TENN. L. tkv.
101148 (1953) ; 40 CALIF. L. REv. 311 (1952). Compare cases note 37 supra.

See Malinski v. New York, supra note 46 at 402. Mr. Justice Rutledge
was so impressed by the fact that the other confessions, which in his opinion
were coerced, might afford a basis for a jury to convict that he felt it necessary to dissent in part because all the confessions were not excluded. Id.
at 420-432.
4
9Id. at 404.
50 343 U. S. 181 (1952).
51
People v. Stroble, 30 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P. 2d 330 (1951).
52
See Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952). See also 40 CALIF.
L. REv. 311 (1952).
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cumstances surrounding the confession and declared it to have been
voluntarily made. This was indeed an unusual decision for the Supreme Court and it is submitted that such a radical change of general
policy would not have been made if the Court had not considered
the rule of the Malinski case to be binding upon them.
It appears that the heart of the controversy over coerced confessions lies in the reason why their exclusion is required to effect
"due process" of law. Some authorities advance the proposition that
coerced confessions are inadmissible as evidence because of their
intrinsic unreliability.53 From a strictly "evidence" point of view this
would seem to be a proper conclusion. However, in the United
States, we have an additional requirement with which confessions
must comply, i.e., "due process of law." Mr. Justice Jackson and a
majority of the Court in the Stein case seem to be of the opinion that
it is the basic unreliability of a coerced confession which renders its
use as evidence against a defendant violative of "due process." 54
However, the Supreme Court has time and time again reiterated the
principle that the question is not one of truth or falsity, but rather
the objection is to the methods used in obtaining the confession.5
The extent to which this censure of barbaric police work will be
carried is best illustrated by the recent development in the area of
"unreasonable search and seizure." The interdict of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was first declared applicable to the several states in Wolf v. Colorado.56 That
case made it clear, however, that the states were free to choose their
own methods for protecting their citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Although the federal courts give sanction to the
Fourth Amendment by excluding evidence obtained in violation
thereof, the Wolf case held that the state courts were not bound to
that method.5 7 In Rochin v. California58 it appeared that some narcotics were pumped up from the defendant's stomach for use as evidence. The California courts do not follow the federal rule excluding evidence illegally obtained, and thus the drugs were admitted into
evidence at the trial. The Supreme Court of the United States, unwilling to disturb their holding in Wolf v. Colorado,5 9 proclaimed
53

See 3

WIGmORE, EVIDENCE

§ 822 (3d ed. 1940).

54See Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953) passiin.
55 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596

(1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S.227 "(1940); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U. S.278 (1936) ; People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553 (1951),
cert. denied, 345 U. S.918 (1953). See also note 47 supra. "If torture is to
be accepted as a means of securing confessions, let us have no pretense about
it but repeal section 395." Pound, J., in People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170.
178, 172 N. E. 458, 461 (1930).
56338

U. S.25 (1949).

57 Ibid.
58342 U. S. 165 (1952).

59 See note 56 supra.
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the admission of the evidence to be entirely consistent with the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. However, the barbaric methods
employed by the police so shocked the conscience of the Court that it
was moved to hold the introduction of the evidence obtained thereby
to be violative of the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 Surely it cannot be contended that narcotics are rendered
unreliable as evidence simply because the methods used to obtain
them are illegal. Evidence of any type, obtained by violent, illegal
intrusion upon a defendant's person, 01 is inadmissible because it violates the spirit of fairness of this nation's accusatorial criminal administration system and thus contravenes an enlightened concept of "due
process of law." 02
Thus, prior to the Stein case, it appeared that, if the states failed
to control their lawless police, the Supreme Court would do so by
reversing every conviction where it appeared that a coerced confession was admitted into evidence. 3 It seemed obvious that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a fair trial could not be had if
such a confession had been admitted regardless of the sufficiency of
the other evidence. However, the majority of the Court in the Stein
case disagreed with this view. They felt that "due process" requires a reversal only if the confession was absolutely essential to the
verdict of guilty. This view fails to recognize that a confession of
guilt is perhaps the most damning form of evidence which can be introduced against a defendant.6
Since it is impossible to tell what
weight a jury has given to a confession and because of the undeniably
prejudicial nature of such evidence, it would seem that a fair trial
is practically impossible where a coerced confession has been admitted,
regardless of the other evidence.05 The rule of the Malinski case and
6o Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172 (1952), 26 ST.
338;61 see 40 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1952).
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66 HARv. L. REV. 122, 124 (1952).
See Rochin v. California, supra note 60 at 169.
In this manner the Supreme Court made known its intention to effectuate
the expandability of the "due process" clause so as to meet new threats to
human dignity as they arise.
4 See People v. Bennett, 37 N. Y. 117, 133 (1867) (concurring opinion);
see RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 413 (7th ed. 1948); 3 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 867
(3d ed. 1940); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 215 (15th ed. 1892).
6 The New York system of allowing a jury to decide the coercion issue is
a dangerous one. See note 64 supra. Juries are unpredictable and have been
known to convict on feeling rather than fact. See BARNES AND TEERmS, Nxw
HbRIZONS IN CRImINoLoGY 312-315 (2d ed. 1951). Furthermore, as has been
indicated in note 25 sispra, the "promise of immunity" provision of the present
63

New York statute is entirely too limited. The Model Code of the American
Law Institute contains a more comprehensive view upon the subject. The
Model Code would leave the coercion issue strictly up to the judge. Further,
it would rule out a confession induced by promise made to the defendant
".... which concerned action to be taken by a public official with reference to the
crime and were made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have
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the ratio decidendi of the Rochin case represent an enlightened concept of "due process" which recognizes that clause as an expandable
principle, capable of meeting the challenge of unforeseen "subtle intrusions" upon the inalienable rights of the people of the United
States.
The problems of crime prevention and law enforcement are infinitely more complex on the state level than are those facing the federal courts, due mainly to sheer volume.06 In recognition of this
fact, the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to interfere
with the methods of law enforcement employed by the states. However, this reluctance should not be confused with condonation of
those procedures which endanger basic rights and privileges and, as
has been suggested, the states should acquiesce in the "fundamental
67
dignity" of the principle expounded by the Supreme Court.
The practice of obtaining confessions by violence is detrimental
to the interests of the citizens of New York in several ways.
First: Since it is apparent that the Supreme Court will reverse a conviction based on such evidence regardless of guilt or inno68
cence, the chances of a criminal escaping punishment are increased.
Second: More subtle applications
of torture may result in the
69
conviction of an innocent man.
Third: Barbaric and inhuman police tactics represent an affront to70human dignity and may result in a depraved and demoralized
society.
The problem then is, by what measures may we reduce these
practices to a minimum, if not completely eliminate them? Elevation
of the moral, intelligence and salary standards of the police would
be the most effective method; 7 1 however, the budget limitations of
the power or authority to secure the execution of the threats or promises.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 505 (1942).

66 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 486 (1948).
67 See 40 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1952).
68 "The third degree impairs the efficient administration of criminal justice

in the courts." IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 189 (1931).
69 For a compilation of methods of torture employed by the police see
Note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1930). Innocent men have been convicted, see
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) passim; BARNES AND TEETERS,
NEW HORIzONs IN CRIMINOLOGY 250-253 (2d ed. 1951).
7 r.t. . [Tihe history of the criminal law proves overwhelmingly that
brutal methods of law enforcement are essentially self-defeating, whatever
may be their effect in a particular case." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 55
(1949). "The third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner against
society, and lowers the esteem in which the administration of justice is held
by the public.

. . ."
IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT 190 (1931).
71 Admittedly this would be the most effective and direct attack upon the

problem of police brutality.

However, since it seems apparent that such a
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the state may render this impractical. Reliance upon the Supreme
Court's reversal of coerced confession cases would be misplaced since
in all probability very few of the officers who engage in such practices
read the opinions of the Supreme Court,72 and it is doubtful whether
the few that do are greatly impressed by that tribunal's proclamations. A further danger in such reliance is the possibility of the
coercive tactics being more skillfully applied so as to avoid detection
by a reviewing court.7 3 It would seem that at present there are but
two practical methods of insuring against coerced confessions. Since
almost without exception a coerced confession is preceded by an unreasonable delay in arraignment, 74 such a delay should render a confession obtained during its continuance inadmissible per se. The
adversaries of a rule of evidence which would exclude confessions obtained during an unlawful delay in arraignment argue that such a
rule would unduly restrict officers of the law in their fight against
crime and is, in addition, an indirect rather than direct assault upon
the problem of coerced confessions. It is further argued that such a
rule would allow an admittedly guilty criminal to escape punishment for the most flagitious of crimes simply because the police have
also violated the law.7 5 It should be remembered that the rule of
evidence would exclude only those confessions obtained during an
unreasonable delay in arraignment and thus a valid reason for delay
would remove the confession from the operation of the rule.78 As
to the argument that the rule would permit criminals to escape justice, it may be answered that the use of a coerced confession in evidence has often had the same effect due to a reversal by a higher
court.77 Furthermore, to argue that incidental illegality of police
procedure has no direct bearing on the voluntary nature of a confession is to ignore the obvious. The federal courts have wisely recognized that where no reasonable explanation for the delay exists,
program, if it is undertaken at all, will take a considerable time to develop,
we must have some immediate legislation to handle the problem in the interim.
72 Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause, 15 BRooKLYN
L. Rrv. 51, 70-71 (1948).
73 Ibid.
74 If the reader will check, he will find that almost every case cited in this
article which involves a coerced confession also involves a delay in arraignment. The connection is too close to attribute to mere coincidence. If no
reasonable explanation can be advanced for the delay in arraignment and a
confession has been obtained during this period, the conclusion is inescapable
that the delay was for the purpose of extracting the confession. Destroy the
breeding places and you destroy the disease.
75 Judge Cardozo advanced such an argument against the federal rule of

evidence which excludes articles which have been obtained through an unlawful
search and seizure. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 23, 150 N. E. 585, 588,
cert. denied, 270 U. S. 657 (1926).
76 For an appraisal of the broadened interpretation of what constitutes a
necessary delay in arraignment, see 100 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 136, 139 (1951).
7 See cases note 37 supra.
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the probability that it was intended to, and did, secure an involuntary
confession is increased to the degree of practically excluding any
other possibility.78 Such logic should commend itself to the legislature of New York. Furthermore, the heretofore ignored provisions
of Section 1844 of the Penal Law, making it a misdemeanor to unreasonably delay a prisoner's arraignment, should be strictly enforced. 79 In this manner, the sovereign State of New York would
indicate to its police that lazy, brutal, and unconscionable methods
of criminal investigation will be no more tolerated in the courts of
this state than they are in the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is to be further hoped that the Stein case will be limited to its
peculiar facts and that the policy of the Malinski and Rochin cases,
envisioning a growing concept of "due process," will continue to be
the law of the land.

A
SHIPOWNER'S LIABILITY FOR THE "UNsEAWORTHINESS" OF A VESSEL
DUE TO AN ASSAULT BY A FELLOW CREWMEMBER

The seaman, in his position as the favored "ward of Admiralty,"
has historically been treated generously in compensation benefits for
disabilities suffered during employment. The passage of years has in
no way diminished the propensity of the courts to aid an injured
seaman. Indeed, the courts' patronage has become so zealous that
Judge Learned Hand apparently felt that it was time to apply the
judicial brakes just short of holding the employer to be an absolute
insurer of the safety of workers in his employ. In the recent case of
Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit refused to hold a shipowner liable to an employe for injuries
sustained due to an assault by a fellow crewmember. The plaintiff
and a seaman named Hunter had an argument in the ship's engine
room. Upon returning to his quarters, plaintiff was viciously as78 The federal rule of evidence established in McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1943), modified by United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65
(1944), and clarified in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948), recognizes that when the delay in commitment was for the sole purpose of extracting a confession, the probability of coercion is so great that an irrebuttable
presumption of its presence arises. See 26 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 351 (1952).
S9Diligent research has failed to reveal one case in which a police officer
was prosecuted under this section although violations of § 165 abound in the
field of criminal procedure. See Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due

Process Clause, 15 BROOKLyN L. REv. 51, 70-71 (1948).

1204 F. 2d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 72 (1953).

